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The Bougainville Crisis and Politics
in Papua New Guinea
YawSaffu
In its sixteenth year of independent statehood, the political regime in
Papua New Guinea (PNG) remains a vibrant liberal democracy of the
Westminster parliamentary type with extensive devolution of powers to
nineteen provincial governments, each with its own elected assembly and
cabinet. But having retained a unilateral capacity to alter functions
between itself and the provinces, and having kept a tight hold on the reve-
nue sources and the purse strings, the central government is not as consti-
tutionally shackled as in a true federation. The public service and the judi-
ciary are not decentralized.
From the pre-independence, self-government period of the early seven-
ties right up to 1991, governments in Papua New Guinea have been coali-
tion governments of up to five parties. The party system is highly frac-
tionalized. The parties in it are a combination of feeble electoral machines
that sputter into life just before elections and pragmatic parliamentary fac-
tions with no strong internal discipline, no abiding adherence to an ideol-
ogy or party principles, and no deep loyalty to party leaders. Together
with the coalition character of governments, these attributes of the party
system have made the country's politics not only extremely open and tol-
erant, but also somewhat unstable and unpredictable.
Four genuinely free elections since 1972 have resulted in only one
change, in 1982, of an incumbent government. But three changes of gov-
ernment through a vote of no confidence on the floor of Parliament, in
1980, 1985, and 1988, have occurred. The effectiveness of this method of
changing government has been a factor in its frequent use. An atmosphere
of government panic, lack of will, instability, and open auction of support
of members of Parliament to the highest bidder has often resulted.
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 4, Number 2, Fall I992, 325-343
© I992 by University ofHawaii Press
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL I992
Have the fundamentals of PNG politics changed as a result of the
Bougainville crisis? This paper will provide first an update of the Bougain-
ville crisis to IS November I99I, two and a half years after the giant
Panguna copper mine was forced to close and a state of emergency was
declared in the province, and more than eighteen months after the govern-
ment abandoned the province to the rebels under a cease-fire agreement.
Second, changes in policy or trends in the political process that can be
attributed to the rebellion, or that have been hastened by it, will be
addressed. Finally, I will attempt to answer the question: Where does it all
lead to?
THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS: IS NOVEMBER 1991
The devastation that has overtaken the North Solomons Province, the
richest, the most advanced, sophisticated, and almost certainly the best
run province in Papua New Guinea (Axline I986), seems to confirm the
essential vulnerability of progress in postcolonial states of recent vintage.
The political future of the province was no clearer on IS November I99I
than it was on I March I990, the day an ambiguous cease-fire agreement
was signed between the national government and the Bougainville rebels
(Saffu I99Ib).
By I6 March I990 representatives of the national government, perhaps
exceeding their obligation under the agreement, had withdrawn all secu-
rity personnel from the province, including general-duty policemen who
were there before the buildup of government security forces. The rebels
were supposed to surrender their weapons. But they did not, and they
could not be made to. Instead of undertaking peace talks, which were
expected to follow the cease-fire, the rebels declared their independence
on I7 May. Only the combined effects of a total economic blockade
imposed by the national government and the failure of the new Republic
of Mekaamui to attract international recognition finally brought the
rebels to peace talks on board a New Zealand frigate, the Endeavour, on
29 July I990 •
The so-called Endeavour Accord, reached on 6 August, did not touch
on the fundamental question of Bougainville's political status. This was
deferred to future talks. The accord was primarily about restoration of
services, which the government undertook to ensure, while the Bougain-
ville Revolutionary Army (BRA) leaders undertook to guarantee the safety
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of government personnel returning to provide those services. The govern-
ment sought to use the Endeavour Accord to resurrect its authority in the
province. But the attempt to infiltrate troops back into the province along
with services so angered the BRA leadership that the follow-up peace talks,
expected in September or October, did not materialize until 22 January
I99I at Honiara, the Solomon Islands capital.
The Honiara talks and the declaration that resulted on 24 January once
again side-stepped the difficult issues of secession and independence, the
reopening of the Panguna mine, and whether the subsidiary of Conzinc
Rio Tinto of Australia, Bougainville Copper Limited, would be allowed to
return to operate the mine. As Father John Momis, the Melanesian Alli-
ance leader and the only Cabinet member from the North Solomons Prov-
ince, of which Bougainville is the largest component, stated: "To deal with
all the issues together would lead to an impasse in a short time" (pc, 25 Feb
I99I). "Patience," he said, "is the mother of success in this exercise" (pc, 26
Feb I99I).
Even more prominently than in the Endeavour Accord, the restoration
of services, government and commercial, was the centerpiece of the
Honiara Agreement. A civilian task force, eventually headed by Father
Momis, and dominated by Bougainvilleans who were at least BRA sympa-
thizers, was set up to oversee the restoration of services, reconstruction,
and, hopefully, the return of Bougainville to normalcy. Once again, the
BRA was expected to surrender its weapons to a proposed multinational
force and to aid the recovery program. While the BRA held on to its weap-
ons, it demanded the withdrawal of government security personnel from
Buka Island, which had become heavily occupied, by invitation, since Sep-
tember I990, and was the interim administrative headquarters of the
North Solomons Province.
As with the Endeavour Accord, each side sought to extract from the
Honiara Agreement a moral cover for the ultimately irreconcilable agenda
of Bougainvillean secession versus PNG national unity. Also, as with the
earlier accord, the nonattendance of rebel leader Francis Ona and Com-
mander of the BRA Sam Kauona left them free to repudiate aspects of
the agreement they believed undermined their cause. Despite the slight-
ly higher moral advantage which the PNG government derived from
the Honiara Agreement (both parties agreed "to embark on a joint
programme of peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation within the cur-
rent framework of the PNG constitution"), the restoration of services by
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the national government, given the de facto BRA control, made a creep-
ing consolidation of independence and secession look almost as like-
ly as creeping re-integration. An inherently unstable situation was
created, where the temptation to use force was bound to be strong on both
sides.
Thus, Sam Kauona's death threat to the task force members who in
February accompanied the first ship to call at Kieta wharf since the impo-
sition of the economic blockade in March 1990 was not surprising. The
BRA leaders accepted fuel and medicine but rejected food. Imported food
was neither strategic for BRA political control nor necessary for people's
physical survival. On the contrary, unless people got used to the absence
of imported food, the BRA'S authority could be undermined. Similarly, the
unauthorized landing of troops in northern Bougainville in April 1991 by
the commander of the troops on Buka, Colonel Leo Nuia, was not sur-
pnsmg.
Unlike Momis and the members of the task force, the soldiers and the
relatively few Cabinet members with more mainstream, statist outlooks,
such as then Deputy Prime Minister Ted Diro and Defence Minister Ben
Sabumei, believed that restoration of government and commercial services
must follow government control of an area (ie, government security per-
sonnel must be around) otherwise the BRA could achieve secession by
stealth. Colonel Nuia's action in landing troops and blowing up a bridge
to secure military advantage embarrassed, frightened, and divided the
government. It also breached the Honiara Agreement's prohibition of the
use of force (but, then, the rebels had not shown any marked desire to
honor the agreement's provisions either). The "incursion," as Father
Momis termed it, was a clear instance of soldiers acting outside the politi-
cal control of the civilian government. However, the colonel got away
with only a reprimand, far less than Father Momis wished, because the
operation was deemed a military success. Colonel Nuia's effectiveness in
eliminating BRA influence on Buka was seen as promising for a similar
result elsewhere. Further, the government accepted his claim that the
chiefs and other influentials invited him. By the end of April, the prime
minister could say, more optimistically than truthfully, that "the state is
back in control on Bougainville" (pc, 29 April 1991).
A critical third round of talks was scheduled for the end of July. The
government's position, reiterated by the prime minister and by the govern-
ment negotiators, was that unless ana and Kauona agreed to attend, the
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talks would not be held. Further, the prime minister insisted that the third
round of talks deal with the political questions "once and for all" (pc, 27
Feb 1991). But as the end of July approached, the multinational force
demanded by the BRA before the next talks, and agreed to at Honiara, was
not in place. The rebels suddenly renewed their attacks on the troops in
July, inflicting casualties. Key members of the rebels' negotiating team
were in Geneva at the end of July to lobby the world community to recog-
nize Bougainvilleans as an endangered minority people, under threat from
a government bent on exploitation and suppression of their human rights
(pc, I Aug 1991). It was announced that 26 August had been agreed on as
the new date for the talks. But it was clear that unless the rebels decided
not to insist on the presence of the multilateral force, the talks would not
be held on the appointed day. Indeed, they were not, and a new date in
October was announced. The October date passed with no talks and no
new date.
Judging by the correspondence columns of the national daily, the Post
Courier, the belief seemed widespread that the government had lost its
way on Bougainville. The chief government negotiators both resigned,
one in February and one in March, out of frustration, while both the
prime minister and the defense minister publicly doubted the BRA'S com-
mitment to a peaceful solution (pc, 19-22 July 1991). At the end of June,
after an interview on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation program
"Four Corners," in which he allowed his obvious frustrations with both
his commander and the government to get the better of his judgment,
Colonel Nuia had to be sacked. Nuia's replacement had still not taken up
the post on Buka by IS November, insisting that the government clarify its
objectives in Bougainville and the military's role in them. A reduction of
military personnel in Buka and Bougainville, from an estimated 800-
1000, was announced (pc, IS July 1991). Meanwhile, on the recommenda-
tion of the task force, Father Momis pressed on with the establishment of
district coordinating authorities on Bougainville because "people are com-
plaining about services not reaching them." He appealed to the govern-
ment for more funds for the reconstruction program (pc, I, 4 July 1991).
By November, Cabinet had approved the establishment of six district
authorities, four on Bougainville and one each for Buka and the atolls
(Nissan, Carteret, MortIock, Tasman, and Fead), in what could be
regarded as an attempt at a bureaucratic solution, as against a military or
even a political solution.
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IMPACT ON POLICY AND ATTITUDES
The political impact of the Bougainville crisis can be viewed usefully from
a legislative standpoint. Between January 1989 and the end of August
1991, 108 bills were passed by the PNG Parliament. These included rou-
tine legislation such as appropriation bills and their consequential bills to
change taxes, duties, and tariffs. Of 37 acts in 1989, only the Emergency
(Bougainville) (General Powers) Act passed, in July to legalize the declara-
tion of emergency in June, was clearly induced by the crisis.
In 1990, 43 bills were passed, of which only the Mining (Amendment)
Act and the Land (Amendment) Act presented a prima facie case for inves-
tigation to determine the extent of their relationship with the crisis. The
first amended Chapter 195 of the Mining Act to give exclusive rights to tra-
ditional landowners to mine alluvial gold found on their land up to a
depth of 20 meters. The second gave the minister more discretionary pow-
ers over land in disaster areas. To the extent that Bougainville provided
ammunition to the opposition in its perennial effort to replace the govern-
ment, two related bills passed in July, the Parliamentary Secretaries Act
and the Parliamentary Secretaries (Consequential Amendment) Act, could
by a stretch of imagination be linked tenuously with the Bougainville cri-
sis. They provided the government with an opportunity to exercise further
patronage over the backbench in order to secure support during the fre-
quent motions of no confidence.
The 1991 parliamentary sessions passed more laws that might appear to
be responses to the Bougainville crisis. In the May sitting, the Investment
Promotion Act and the Peace and Good Order Act were passed. The for-
mer created an Investment Promotion Authority. There is no question that
the Bougainville crisis has dealt a blow to investor confidence in Papua
New Guinea. At least, the government's hiring of international image-
makers to counter the effects of the crisis in this regard suggests that that is
its perception. Wesley-Smith attributes the supersession of the regulatory
National Investment Development Authority (NIDA) by the Investment
Promotion Authority to the need to restore investor confidence and entice
foreign investors into the nonmining private sector, in accordance with the
IMF- and World Bank-supported Structural Adjustment Programme
(Wesley-Smith 1991). Loathed by prospective foreign investors as obstruc-
tive, NIDA had been recommended for abolition at least five years earlier
by the influential Independent Group that reviewed the PNG economy
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(Goodman, Lepani, and Morawetz 1985). The Peace and Good Order
Act, on the other hand, is a law aimed at reining in what several PNG gov-
ernments have regarded as excesses of democracy and liberty, by control-
ling processions and public meetings. It is also a disguised Vagrancy Act.
It attempts to deal with the problem of squatter settlements by making it
an offense to occupy, under certain circumstances, the land of another
person.
Two other laws passed in the same session of Parliament, Constitu-
tional Amendments no. II (Liberty of the Person) and no. 13 (Protection
of the Law), were in the same vein as the Peace and Good Order Act. By
strengthening the law-and-order agencies of the state at the expense of
individual liberty, they had more to do with the country's burgeoning law-
and-order problem than with anything else. They were passed at this time,
as were six other constitutional amendments in the July 1991 session,
including the significant breakthrough, the Constitutional Amendment
(Motions of No Confidence) Act, because for the first time the govern-
ment had the numbers to satisfy the amendment procedures: two-thirds
majority (seventy-three members) in two sessions of Parliament separated
by at least two months.
The impact of the Bougainville crisis on the legislature's agenda has
been extremely slight. An Insurgency Act was reportedly drafted in 1989
but was never introduced. An Internment Bill was introduced in the July
1989 session but was withdrawn. One area where the impact has been rel-
atively heavy is the budget. The impact on mining, investment, and
defense policies is far less than might be expected because pressures for
changes in all these areas were under way before the rebellion. The profile
and influence of the World Bank and the IMF on policy-making have
increased. Papua New Guinea's relations with Australia and Indonesia
have been made even closer by the crisis, while the increasing use of Solo-
mon Islands communications and health facilities by the BRA has drawn
angry protests from Port Moresby, leading to speculation that Papua New
Guinea might propose an extradition treaty with the Solomon Islands.
Without access to confidential government papers and top policy-
makers, it is not always easy to maintain a distinction between policies
that have been caused predominantly by the rebellion and those that have
merely been speeded by it. Similarly, in the absence of surveys and in-
depth interviews, the impact of the Bougainville crisis on such public atti-
tudes as those favoring authoritarian measures and those reinforcing
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Melanesian distrust of contract, particularly with foreigners, can only be
inferred from policies and actual behavior. But in three areas the impact
on attitudes has probably been substantial: landowners' sense of em-
powerment, which has reached new and, from the point of view of those
in charge of the state, very disruptive heights; attitudes of top security per-
sonnel to politicians; and provincial governments' sense of their power
vis-a-vis the national government.
The most obvious impact of the Bougainville crisis has been economic
and essentially recessionary. Apart from the loss of foreign exchange and
revenue from the Panguna mine itself, the loss of over three thousand jobs
at the mine, and the collapse of service companies dependent on the mine
and on the incomes of its employees, tree crop exports from the North
Solomons Province dried up with the flight of plantation workers and
managers and the imposition of economic blockade. In 1988, the province
was the second largest producer of copra and accounted for 45 percent of
the country's cocoa exports. According to Weisman, simulations of the
PNG economy with the Computerized General Equilibrium Model devel-
oped at the Australian National University showed that over the medium
term the loss to the economy from the closure of the Panguna mine would
represent a decline of about 7 percent in real income (Weisman 1991, 47).
The latest issues (1990 and March 1991) of the Quarterly Economic Bulle-
tin from Papua New Guinea's central bank tell the same story. For
instance, economic activity, as measured by the gross domestic product,
declined by 1.4 percent in 1989 and by 3.7 percent in 1990, while formal
employment in the nonmining sector outside the North Solomons Prov-
ince declined by 5 percent in 1990 (Bank of Papua New Guinea 1991).
Cuts in government expenditure attributable to the crisis began in June
1989, following the closure of Panguna in May. The government imposed
a K25 million reduction in its expenditure, not much of a dent in a budget
of Kl billion because it anticipated a decline of only K20 million to the end
of the year (Weisman 1991; Kl equals approximately US$I). The finance
minister claimed he incorporated the likely effects of the closure in his K1.1
billion 1990 budget which was passed in November 1989. But the Decem-
ber 1989 decision by Bougainville Copper Limited to "mothball" the mine
triggered a package of measures in January 1990, including a 10 percent
devaluation (and, over the year, a further depreciation of the kina by
about 10 percent), further cuts of KI00 million in government expendi-
ture, and a restrained wages policy.
· ~.
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The cooperation of the Public Employees Association (PEA), the largest
and most powerful union, helped to minimize the political impact of these
economic measures. Despite the higher inflation rate that was expected to
flow from the devaluation (at 7 percent the 1990 inflation rate became the
highest since 1984), the employees' association entered into an agreement
with the government in January 1990 to limit pay increases by up to 2 per-
centage points below the Wages Board determination for July 1989 to
March 1992. That the considerable economic impact has not fed into the
political process in any significantly disruptive way may be attributed
partly to the association, but luck and appropriate policies have also
played a role.
The government's cautious easing of credits to the nonmining sector in
1990, the happy coincidence of the opening of new gold mines at Misima
(1989) and Porgera (1990) and expansion of output at Ok Tedi, and the
impact of oil discoveries on further prospecting in 1989 and 1990 all
helped to contain the economic impact of the Bougainville crisis. World
Bank- and IMF-sponsored international support for the stabilization mea-
sures and balance of payments in May 1990, to the tune of US$710 million,
also helped, as did the substantial government draw-down of the Mineral
Stabilizaton Fund, K84.7 million in 1989 and an estimated K80 million in
1990. On the negative side, the opportunity that commentators saw for
Papua New Guinea to become leaner and healthier (Weisman 1991),
through a radical structural adjustment and a drastic pruning of the public
service, has largely been passed up.
In the area of investment, Wesley-Smith attributes to the Bougainville
crisis the decision to lower by 25 percent (from 75 to 50) the local equity
participation required to qualify an enterprise as local. The realization
that this was needed to promote growth in the economy had been around
for some time. But the Bougainville crisis provided the occasion and the
necessary will to withstand the expected "nationalist" condemnation,
which duly came from the Melanesian Chamber of Commerce.
In the area of mining, a new set of policies emerged in April 1989. The
new policies could easily be mistaken for an effect of the Bougainville cri-
sis because they gave landowners and the provincial governments a far
greater opportunity to participate in negotiations and to benefit from min-
ing operations. Landowners now enjoyed higher royalties of 20 percent
(instead of 5) of 1.25 percent of production; and a 5 percent equity partici-
pation (the same as for the provincial government), half of that at cost and
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paid for from future earnings (there had been no such opportunity
before). Landowners also enjoyed preferential treatment for employment,
training, and contracting for services and operations connected with the
mine. They were to be chosen ahead of people from the province who
were themselves to be chosen ahead of other Papua New Guineans. All
these and other higher benefits to landowners and provinces could be
explained as lessons from the Bougainville crisis. However, as Jackson has
shown, the pressures that resulted in these changes predated the Bougain-
ville rebellion (Jackson 1989). What the crisis did was impart a sense of
urgency to reforms that were already underway.
The same is true of defense. In a number of statements, Ben Sabumei,
the defense minister since May 1989, has indicated that his successful Cab-
inet submission to expand the PNG Defence Force, among other changes,
was the result of the operational inadequacies exposed by the counterin-
surgency on Bougainville. It may be difficult to judge accurately the fight-
ing ability of a defense force in a counterinsurgency situation within its
own country, especially when political directives have not been consistent
and single-minded. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the image of the
Defence Force as a competent fighting machine has suffered as a result of
the Bougainville crisis. To overcome the operational weaknesses ascribed
to the low ceiling for defense workers, an increase of two thousand armed
forces personnel over a four-year period was deemed necessary by the
Defence Council and was approved by the Cabinet.
However, a substantial increase in defense personnel, beyond the cur-
rent ceiling of 3200, had been one of the most insistent recommendations
made by a General Defence Board of Inquiry into the February 1989 sol-
diers' riot in Port Moresby (Saffu 199W). A Defence White Paper tabled in
Parliament in 1988 had also argued for an increase in the numbers of the
Defence Force. As for mining, the Bougainville crisis essentially confirmed
for defense policymakers the evident soundness of their policies.
A shift in emphasis in the functions of the Defence Force coincided with
the Bougainville crisis. Both external defense and defense against internal
threats to state and government were established by the PNG Indepen-
dence Constitution as Defence Force functions. Undertaking civic action
programs and providing relief operations in national disasters and
emergencies were the other functions. An increasing realization that exter-
nal defense was not a viable function, if mighty Indonesia was the putative
external enemy, an awareness of the armed forces' potential to contribute
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to infrastructural development, plus the escalation of a law-and-order
problem that necessitated call-outs of defense personnel to support the
embattled police, suggested shifts in emphasis away from external
defense. These were crystallized in the 1988 Defence White Paper where
defense against internal threats to the state and the nation-building capa-
bilities of the Defence Force, through civic-action programs, were particu-
larly emphasized. By virtue of being the most serious internal threat so far
to territorial integrity and authority of state in Papua New Guinea, and
with the prospect of a massive reconstruction to be undertaken at its end,
the Bougainville crisis has been a vindication rather than a cause of the
shift of emphasis in the Defence Force's preoccupations.
On the other hand, there is enough evidence for the view that the
Defence Force is becoming increasingly politicized, both in the sense of the
armed forces being drawn more deeply into politics, especially partisan
politics, and in the sense of officers and men becoming more politically
aware and, consequently, less respectful and less submissive toward civil-
ian authority (Saffu 199W). The Police Department appears to be no less
politicized. The Bougainville crisis is contributing enormously to the fur-
ther politicization of both forces.
As early as February 1989, the police commissioner was fulminating
against politicians when a "raid moratorium" was imposed on the police
in Bougainville: "I am tired of political interference with police work and
political indecision on issues requiring immediate police action to main-
tain law and order" (pc, 27 Feb 1989). According to press reports, he
threatened to disobey the government. The prime minister reprimanded
him while Father John Momis promised that the Cabinet would dismiss
him if he carried out his threat. For his stand, Father Momis was con-
fronted at his home a few days later by more than one hundred irate poli-
cemen who arrived in a convoy of six vehicles to warn him of trouble if
their commissioner was sacked (pc, 6 Mar 1989). A chief superintendent
was suspended in connection with the incident.
BRA attacks on police in Bougainville at this time were leading to public
statements by top policemen who felt it necessary to draw attention to the
rebellious mood among their men: "How long are we going to sit around
and wait? These rebels are firing at police at will and my men are very
frustrated and angry" (pc, 10 Mar 1989). A year later, the chief superin-
tendent who had been suspended earlier was involved with the police
commissioner in a bizarre drunken attempt to abduct the prime minister
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and take over power (Saffu 1991b). The commissioner had been recalled
recently as controller of emergency on Bougainville, and was reportedly
about to be dismissed for acts of insubordination over the implementation
of the cease-fire agreement. After a low-key attempt to prosecute these
and a third officer on charges of treason, all were freed and only the com-
missioner was not reinstated.
In view of their greater ability to overthrow a government, the mili-
tary's display of frustration and insubordination over Bougainville has
received more attention (Standish 1989; May 1991). Both Colonel
Dotaona, in charge of the troops on Bougainville until October 1989, and
Colonel Maras, acting commander of the Defence Force during Brigadier
Lokinap's suspension in 1989, publicly criticized the politicians' handling
of the Bougainville crisis, their inability or reluctance to articulate objec-
tives clearly and the military's role in them, and their inconsistency and
interference in operational matters. Another top officer, the acting chief of
staff, later to be in charge of the troops in Bougainville, publicly warned
his minister to "refrain from making wild statements on matters affecting
the operations of the soldiers and police (on Bougainville)" (NN, 12 Apr
1989). Another officer, a lieutenant colonel, swore at the visiting parlia-
mentary Emergency Committee, ordering them not to meddle in things
they did not know about. Two years later, the public display of soldiers'
frustration and disrespect for politicians was just as vigorous.
In May 1991, a major serving on Bougainville, without any attempt
whatsoever to hide his identity, wrote to the Post Courier, arguing that
Momis must be sacked for "being in the same boat" with secessionists and
the BRA. He ended his letter by saying, "if anybody should be sacked ...
lunatics like Father Momis and his Task Force members are the ones the
government should sack" (pc, 17 May 1991). He merely got a reprimand.
The commander of the forces on Bougainville, Colonel Leo Nuia, as
already mentioned, plainly exhibited his contempt for the civilian govern-
ment he was supposed to be under by publicly contradicting it on several
critical issues relating to the Bougainville crisis and civil-military relations
in Papua New Guinea. His obvious intent, to demonstrate the duplicity
and the incompetence of the government, left the government with no
choice but to dismiss him.
The reaction of the top brass of the Defence Force to the sacking was
evident in the public refusal of Colonel Nuia's replacement to take up the
position until the government had clarified the military's role in the crisis,
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leading the Post Courier to editorialize: "Give Maras His Brief" (pc, 27
June I99I). The simultaneous announcement by the Defence Force hierar-
chy of a drastic reduction in troop levels on Bougainville on the grounds of
shortage of funds was part of the military's reaction to the sacking of
Colonel Nuia. As a spokesman argued: "Until the government can tell the
Defence Force elements in Bougainville what its true role is and support
this financially, we cannot be expected to carry out our task effectively
without drawing unfounded criticisms from the public and most politi-
cians who usually do not know what is happening on the ground" (pc, II
July I99I ).
Unlike the military, the nation's landowners have no means of usurping
governmental authority. But in the conditions of PNG democracy, where
grassroots populism holds sway, and with the onset of a minerals boom,
landowners have clout. The Bougainville rebellion has enhanced their self-
confidence, their perception of their ability to drive home to the govern-
ment both the emulatory and cautionary lessons from Bougainville.
Melanesian cultural values about land (encapsulated in the slogan Land Is
Life, Land Is Marriage, Land Is Power) place landowners in a strong pres-
sure group position, and they enhance this position by their readiness to
question or ignore agreements, and to take the law into their own hands
to enforce their interpretation. A populistic streak among the country's
politicians, illustrated by the following case, also explains why landown-
ers constitute the most successful pressure groups in PNG politics.
Buluminski Highway, running the length of New Ireland Province, was
built by German colonialists before World War I. In view of its importance
to the New Ireland economy, the national government decided in I988 to
improve the road by macadamizing it. Landowners along the highway
demanded compensation for land taken before the improvement program
could begin. One of the best educated and otherwise far-sighted politi-
cians in the country, the premier of the province, backed the landowners'
demand.
In case after case, some of them related in the PNG political chronicles
in the Australian Journal of Politics and History, landowners made hefty
compensation demands, backed their demands with threats of violence if
not met by a certain date, did indeed resort to the threatened violence,
and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, ended up with some compen-
sation and no prosecution for their lawlessness and use of violence.
The concept of eminent domain is under serious attack in Papua New
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Guinea (Oliver 1989). The attack is led by some of the most sophisticated
professionals who are also landowners in their own right, as members of
land-owning clans. Clans own 97 percent of land in the country. Alienated
land is therefore not generally an issue. The attack is driven by the miner-
als boom and dreams of fabulous wealth for lucky landowners. So far,
Supreme Court decisions on who owns the minerals under the soil have
favored the state against landowners. But the threat to state revenues and
national unity inherent in the landowners' challenges is considerable.
WHERE DOES IT ALL LEAD To?
What can one say about the political future of the North Solomons Prov-
ince, a group of islands forming a political and administrative division of
Papua New Guinea, of which Bougainville is by far the largest compo-
nent? Despite the momentous explosion of self-determination elsewhere
(eg, the apparently peaceful dissolution of the mighty Soviet Union), it can
be confidently asserted that nation-states are not about to sacrifice territo-
rial integrity at the altar of self-determination, any more than they were
before the "Second Russian Revolution." National leaders can be expected
to pose the question: How far down can the concept of self-determination
be allowed to go? Should it mean independence and separate sovereignty
for all those who demand it and show a willingness to fight for it? The
question is of special significance in situations such as Papua New Guinea
where the colonial period that created all these apparent "selves" really
effectively began for the most part only after World War II and ended only
sixteen years ago.
The prospect of the North Solomons Province emerging as a happy,
prosperous, small independent state enjoying normal international recog-
nition is the least likely of all possible outcomes of the crisis. Port Mores-
by's strategy of gradual, incremental "pacification," a "wartime" variant of
the time-tested colonial tactic of divide and rule, means that in the
unlikely event of Bougainville independence the new state is most unlikely
to be coextensive with the present North Solomons Province. Buka and
the outer atolls will have to be included by force. Bougainville itself may
not survive as a single unit; it may have to contend with its own secession-
ist problems. Even if independence were eventually to emerge (say in
another five or ten years) after a transitional period of increased auton-
omy and referendum within Papua New Guinea (in my view the best real-
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istic scenario for the secessionists), the new state is more likely to be a
beleaguered, struggling state than a contented one at peace with itself.
The option of a merger with the Solomon Islands after independence
might be a long-shot possibility.
Given the divisions within the province itself (Ogan 1990), given the
consummate capacity of modern PNG political leaders to compromise,
and given that the immediate neighbors who count (and through whom
the wider world's limited interest in the issue will be filtered) are all on the
side of the essential status quo, the most likely outcome of the crisis is that
the North Solomons Province will remain a part of Papua New Guinea,
but with a wider degree of autonomy than before the crisis. Perhaps the
degree of autonomy the BRA will manage to extract from an exasperated
Port Moresby will surpass even that enjoyed by states in a federation.
If so, the question has to be faced whether any such special status for
the North Solomons can be confined to that province only, and not be
insisted on by other provinces that may have no credible basis on which to
operate such extensive autonomy successfully. In a sense, the question is
futile. Irrespective of its likely effect elsewhere in the country, if the grant-
ing of greater autonomy will end the crisis peacefully, then there is no
question that it will be granted. Common sense might suggest that even a
rash of unsupportable autonomies would be a lesser threat to the state, a
far more manageable predicament, than outright secession. However,
greater provincial autonomy, being a less drastic demand than secession,
might be more difficult for the central government to resist, with the result
that a confederation will emerge.
A confederal center will be even less able than now to ensure a minimal
degree of administrative competence and integrity. The location of greater
prizes at the provincial level in any such confederal set-up is likely to spur
on demands for more provinces. The recent and current agitations to
break up existing provinces in Western Province, Eastern Highlands,
Morobe, East New Britain, and so on are likely to be rekindled and inten-
sified, while new demands are likely to break out. In every province there
is a disaffected or a potentially disaffected area that can produce leaders to
champion its cause, however imaginary. The process of state creation in
Nigeria, from three in 1960 to thirty in 1991 (and the process is far from
finished), is worth contemplating in this connection. Admittedly, the pop-
ulation of Nigeria is at least thirty times larger than that of Papua New
Guinea. But after correcting for population, economically, geographically,
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and culturally Nigeria is far more integrated, compact, and homogeneous
than Papua New Guinea.
The adversarial nature of the Westminster model, a feature of it that is
particularly emphasized in Papua New Guinea, appears to have worked in
tandem with the absence of internal party discipline to limit the kind of
unanimity of views that might have aided the passing of authoritarian
laws, in the face of failures and frustrations over Bougainville. In addi-
tion, the Melanesian Way, which is genuinely tolerant, liberal, and incura-
bly casual, is a constraint on authoritarianism, civilian or military. In my
view, these attributes will ensure that despite the frustrations of the secu-
rity forces and their increasing politicization, military rule (as contrasted
with military takeover) will be seen by a rational prospective coupist as
unworkable.
CONCLUSION
The impact so far of the Bougainville rebellion on the political process in
Papua New Guinea has been far more moderate and accommodable than
commentators, myself included, had feared. The Panguna copper mine,
which was forced to shut down in May 1989, had accounted for two-fifths
of the country's annual foreign exchange earnings and one-fifth of the
national government's revenue. The familiar fragility of political institu-
tions and national integration in postcolonial states of recent vintage
added to the fear (Standish 1989; SaHu 1990).
But if we carve up politics into the four dimensions suggested by Almond
and Verba (1963)-regime, government, policy, and citizens' political
behavior, based on their perception of self-confidence-we shall have to say
that the Bougainville rebellion has had absolutely no impact as yet on the
regime, defined as the basic, overall constitutional or legal framework for
rulership and politics. There have been minor changes in government, Cab-
inet and bureaucratic reshuffles, but none of these is credibly traceable to
the Bougainville crisis. Some policy changes, for example, in the mining sec-
tor, in the general area of foreign investment, and in personnel levels of the
Defence Force, have arguably been hastened by the Bougainville crisis. Per-
haps the crisis has had the greatest impact on the confidence of some
groups, particularly landowners who have emerged as among the most
powerful pressure groups in the nation's politics today.
'"
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Although the repercussions from the crisis have so far remained rela-
tively modest, changes in the regime dimension can be expected to occur,
if only because the earlier status quo, in relations between the central gov-
ernment and the North Solomons Province, is no longer a realistic option.
The bitterness of the conflict, the fighting and deaths, the scale of vio-
lence, and the propagation of secessionist sentiment all indicate changes in
the politics stemming from the crisis.
The extent and nature of these changes cannot be known precisely at
this stage, given that the duration of the crisis, how it is finally resolved,
and the cast of leaders at the time can all influence changes in the state's
authority, center-periphery relations, and the operating methods of pow-
erful interest groups. The magnitude of the changes envisaged will also
depend to some extent on how one responds to the Griffin-Filer debate. Is
Bougainville essentially a class by itself, a unique catastrophe, as the title
of Griffin's paper proclaims (Griffin 1991)? Or is Bougainville a harbinger
of the social disintegration that is waiting to happen at other major mine
sites, Ok Tedi, Porgera, Misima, and elsewhere, with harmful conse-
quences for political order and regime legitimacy, as Filer contends (Filer
1990 )?
The North Solomons forced the provincial government system on
Papua New Guinea, through the generalization of the concessions made
to it in 1976 to end its first secessionist bid. There is little reason to doubt
that however the second secessionist bid is resolved it will have a strong
impact on the expectations and behavior of other landowners and provin-
cial actors.
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